Description

This book has grown out of an attempt toharmonize two different tendencies, one in psychology, the other inphysics, with both of which I find myself in sympathy, although atfirst sight they might seem inconsistent. On the one hand, manypsychologists, especially those of the behaviourist school, tend toadopt what is essentially a materialistic position, as a matter ofmethod if not of metaphysics. They make psychology increasinglydependent on physiology and external observation, and tend to thinkof matter as something much more solid and indubitable than mind.Meanwhile the physicists, especially Einstein and other exponentsof the theory of relativity, have been making "matter" less andless material. Their world consists of "events," from which"matter" is derived by a logical construction. I think that whathas permanent value in the outlook of the behaviourists is thefeeling that physics is the most fundamental science at present inexistence. But this position cannot be called materialistic, if, asseems to be the case, physics does not assume the existence ofmatter.